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Abstract 
The practice of dowry is often thought to be the root cause of the unequal treatment of women 
in India. For women without inheritance rights, however, dowry may function as their only 
source of protection. Using a nationwide dataset and exploiting a natural experimental situation, 
this study explores the effects of dowry on women’s empowerment in India, a society where 
women do not have inheritance rights. In such a society, dowry seems to enhance women’s 
status in the marital household. The effects reverse when women have equal inheritance rights 
as their brothers. Empirical analysis suggests that the outright ban on dowry that ignores the 
context may not necessarily benefit women.  
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1. Introduction 
Women’s empowerment, broadly defined as gaining control over their own lives,1 has attracted 
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the attention of people engaged in development issues, as it seems important in alleviating 
poverty and promoting economic development (World Bank 2011; Duflo 2012). In addition to it 
being a potential means leading to poverty alleviation, women’s empowerment in itself should 
be an objective to assure women’s rights and dignity. Thus, no one would deny the importance 
of achieving women’s empowerment. Given its importance, researchers have investigated the 
methods to enhance women’s empowerment. Microeconomists consider that women’s 
bargaining position within the household is the key to determining women’s empowerment. 
Women with more outside options have a higher reservation utility and thus have relatively 
more bargaining power within the household (the Nash bargaining model: for example, Manser 
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981). A typical outside option is based on the working 
opportunities for women because it is easier for women with a lucrative job to make a living 
without their husband. The amount of immovable assets (e.g., land and houses) that women 
possess is also considered to be important because securing a place to stay is most indispensable 
when leaving their husbands (Panda and Agarwal 2005). Outside options may also be broadened 
by the easiness of divorce without spousal consent (Friedberg 1998; Wolfers 2006) and 
favorable marriage-market situations (e.g., Becker 1991; Chiappori et al. 2002).  
In the context of South Asian countries, where divorce is very rare and women usually do 
not work outside the home or have access to immovable property in reality, the aforementioned 
outside options are irrelevant in most cases. While the outside options are usually interpreted in 
terms of opportunities when the current marriage dissolves (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 
and Horney 1981), they do not necessarily require divorce. Theoretically, noncooperative 
equilibrium can be an outside option (Lundberg and Pollak 1993). Without divorce, women may 
go back to their natal families. In this case, the level of support that the natal families can offer 
is important, as measured by the strength of the women’s bond with their natal families and the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1 In empirical studies, it is often measured by the extent to which women can decide various matters, 
have autonomy of their own, are free from mental and physical threats within the household, and can 
move freely and independently by themselves.  
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assets owned by the natal families. Furthermore, the status of working women is not particularly 
high in South Asian countries. Several studies indicate that women’s working opportunities and 
wages do not affect the bargaining position of women within the household, whereas the 
possession of immovable assets such as land and houses does affect their bargaining position 
(e.g., Panda and Agarwal 2005). In particular, the northern states of India are well known for 
women’s lower status in every aspect, such as property rights, sex ratio, fertility, and gender gap 
in education and mortality (Dyson and Moore 1983; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001). In northern 
India, the traditional factors such as the number of sons to whom women gave birth and the 
amount of dowry that women brought at the time of marriage are believed to positively affect 
women’s empowerment (Jejeebhoy 2000).  
This study examines the above hypothesis suggested by Jejeebhoy (2000). The focus is on 
the effect of dowry on women’s status in the marital household. In particular, we investigate the 
difference between the environments where women have no access and where women have 
equal access to immovable assets as their brothers. We exploit a natural experimental situation 
in India that generated such environmental differences across states, namely, the amendment of 
the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 that occurred in five states from 1976 to 1994. The empirical 
results reveal that the amount of dowry is positively associated with women’s empowerment in 
the context where women have no access to immovable assets.  
The closest to this study may be those by Zhang and Chan (1999) and Brown (2009), 
which test the Nash bargaining model with the amount of dowry as an outside option using 
datasets for Taiwan and China, respectively. Using the same theoretical framework, this study 
tests whether dowry enhances women’s welfare in the context of India where, traditionally, 
women have had no property rights. While the study by Jejeebhoy (2000) demonstrates that 
dowry enhances women’s decision-making power in a northern state (i.e., Uttar Pradesh) but not 
in a southern state (i.e., Tamil Nadu), it does not investigate which factor generates such 
regional differences. By explicitly examining the relationship between women’s empowerment 
4 
 
and the legal provision of inheritance rights, this study fills the gap. The results also suggest that 
the argument that dowry represents a pre-mortem inheritance (Tambiah 1973; Botticini and 
Siow 2003) is also applicable in modern India.  
The results have several important policy implications. They suggest that the universal ban 
on dowry does not necessarily achieve its intended policy consequences such as the welfare 
improvement and empowerment of women. Rather, dowry may function as the only measure to 
protect women in the context where their property rights do not exist in reality. If so, then the 
bride’s parents would be willing to pay the highest dowry amount possible at the time of their 
daughter’s marriage, with the expectation of better treatment of their daughter in the marital 
household. This may be one of the reasons of the well-known ineffectiveness of India’s Dowry 
Prohibition Act of 1961. The results simultaneously suggest that the legal provision of equal 
inheritance rights for both daughters and sons, regardless of whether equal inheritance is 
actually realized, may be effective if the policymakers’ aim is to end the dowry practice. This is 
because the parents would not have any incentive to give dowry to their daughters if it would 
not affect their daughters’ welfare in the marital household after the daughters are given equal 
inheritance rights as their brothers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background, 
namely, the practice of dowry and the amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 3 
describes the dataset used in the empirical study. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy. 
Section 5 provides the empirical results. Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
  
2. Background: Dowry Practice and Amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
2.1.  Dowry Practice 
Dowry, broadly defined as the transfer at the time of marriage from the bride’s parents to their 
daughter as well as the groom and his family, was traditionally observed only among the Hindu 
higher caste. Nowadays, the practice is prevalent in South Asia not only among Hindus but also 
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among people such as Muslims who had originally practiced bride price (i.e., a transfer from the 
groom’s parents to the bride’s parents).  
Dowry in India is often considered to be the root cause of the unequal treatment of girls 
vis-à-vis boys, as represented by sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, and the 
undernourishment of girls. This treatment leads to the notorious phenomenon of “missing 
women,” which refers to an unnaturally high male to female ratio in South Asia (e.g., Sen 1990). 
Dowry is also severely criticized by the media as well as academics as it can lead to “dowry 
murder” and “dowry suicide” (Stone and James 1995; Rudd 2001; Bloch and Rao 2002; Sekhri 
and Storeygard 2014).2 Given these alleged negative consequences, the Dowry Prohibition Act 
of 1961 prohibits the practice. However, this legal prohibition is well known for its 
ineffectiveness.  
Although dowry is believed to be an evil practice, empirical evidence is scarce. One of the 
main reasons may be that data concerning dowries are unavailable or unreliable. Because it is a 
banned practice, questionnaire respondents are unwilling to reveal the correct amounts of dowry, 
especially the dowry recipients. Moreover, the respondents retrospectively state the dowry 
amount paid at the time of their own marriages, and thus, recall errors are common. The 
empirical evidence under these limitations of data is consequently limited and mixed. Some 
studies show that dowry enhances women’s welfare in the marital household (e.g., Bloch and 
Rao 2002; Srinivasan and Bedi 2007),3 but the opposite is found in other studies (e.g., Suran et 
al. 2004). The mixed empirical evidence is not surprising because the effects of dowry may be 
different across different contexts, even in South Asia. For example, Jejeebhoy (2000) shows 
                                                        
2 “Dowry murder” is officially defined as any instance where the death of a woman is caused by any 
burns or bodily injury or occurs in circumstances other than under normal circumstances within 7 
years of her marriage, and it is proven that prior to her death, she was subjected to cruelty or 
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for 
dowry (the Dowry Prohibition Amendment Act, 1986). Some criticize the term “dowry murder” 
because it is likely to include any kind of homicide, including those presumably unrelated to dowry 
(for example, Kishwar 1989; Narayan 1997; Leslie 1998; Oldenburg 2002; Palriwala 2009).  
3 Using datasets other than those from South Asia, some evidence exists showing a positive effect of 
dowry on women’s welfare in the marital household (e.g., Zhang and Chan 1999; Brown 2009).  
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that dowry leads to women’s empowerment in the northern part of India, where women’s status 
is relatively low, while it does not have this effect in the southern part of the country. 
Dowry has attracted economists’ interest more in theoretical studies than in empirical 
studies. According to Becker (1991), the one who gains in the marriage pays the price at the 
time of marriage (the price model). Being consistent with the price model, dowry is often 
interpreted as the compensation by the bride’s parents to the groom and his parents, which 
reflects people’s perception in South Asia that women do not contribute to family income 
because they usually do not participate in the market labor (Boserup 2007; Anderson 2007). 
Another interpretation is that dowry is a pre-mortem bequest from the bride’s parents to the 
bride (the bequest model). According to Becker (1991), daughters who have no property rights 
and do not inherit their parents’ assets may be given dowries at the time of marriage. The 
necessary conditions to the bequest model are patrilocality and poor property rights (Botticini 
and Siow 2003; Arunachalam and Logan 2015). Most parts of South Asia are characterized by 
patrilineal and patrilocal societies where, in practice, women have no property rights. The price 
and bequest models are not necessarily mutually exclusive, although studies seem to focus on 
the distinction between the two (e.g., Anderson 2004, 2007; Arunachalam and Logan 2015).4 
Furthermore, some refute the bequest model based on the fact that the value of dowry is usually 
much lower than that of immovable assets inherited by male siblings (e.g., Agarwal 1994). No 
matter how much lower the value is, this fact does not necessarily refute the bequest nature of 
dowry; that is, gifts by the bride’s parents to their daughter. In a society where, in practice, 
women do not inherit parental land, dowry may be the only asset for women and their only 
source of protection (Kishwar 1988, 1989). 
 
2.2. Amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
                                                        
4 Quite recently, Anderson and Bidner (2015) formalize the simultaneous dual role of dowry as a 
price and a bequest.  
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Inheritance practices and their legal provisions, which differ by the religion to which one 
belongs, are very complicated in India. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is applicable to 
Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs, who represent more than 80% of the population in India.  
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, embodies the gender discriminatory nature of inheritance 
practices in India. While it assures equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters concerning 
separate or non-ancestral property, it excludes daughters from joint family property, which is 
estimated to constitute 84% of the total household property in India (Roy 2015). Several states 
have amended this discriminatory provision to assure equal inheritance rights for both daughters 
and their brothers with respect to joint family assets: Kerala in 1976, Andhra Pradesh in 1986, 
Tamil Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994 (Figure 1). The Hindu Succession 
Act was finally amended at the central government level in 2005. These amendments, either at 
the state or central government levels, are along the same lines: they stipulated that the daughter 
of a coparcener will acquire coparcenary rights equally with her brothers at birth, but only if she 
were unmarried at the time of the amendment.  
Empirical evidence on whether the amendment actually led to women inheriting 
immovable property is mixed. Some studies indicate that the amendment increased women’s 
likelihood of inheriting land (e.g., Deininger et al. 2013). In contrast, other studies such as that 
by Roy (2015) find that the amendment had no impact on the likelihood of inheritance by 
women. Whether or not an actual inheritance is realized, the studies seem to agree that the 
amendment affects people’s expectation and perception about women’s inheritance rights, and 
enhances women’s empowerment, which may be represented by several aspects, such as the 
characteristics of a woman’s spouse and his family; her level of education, age at marriage, and 
reproductive decisions; and her status in the marital household, including her vulnerability to 
domestic violence. For example, despite the fact that she finds no impact of the amendment on 
the actual likelihood of inheritance by women, Roy (2015) finds that it enhances women’s level 
of education, whereby parents are believed to compensate their daughters with more schooling 
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in place of their disinheritance. 
 
3. Data 
The data used for this study are from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), 2005, 
which covers 41,554 households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighborhoods across India. 
The IHDS includes information such as marriage, fertility, and gender relations, as well as 
socioeconomic characteristics of households and individual members. One of the salient 
features of the IHDS is that the education and health questionnaire is answered by “eligible 
women,” defined as those who were ever married between the ages of 15 and 49. The education 
and health questionnaire includes specific questions closely relevant to this study, such as dowry 
payments and detailed gender relations within the household. We restrict our sample to 20,321 
married women aged 15 to 49 whose husbands are the heads of households. 
The IHDS reports variables that measure the extent of the women’s bargaining position, 
specifically, the women’s decision-making power within the household. When the female 
respondent has the “most say” in a specific household decision-making matter, it is indicated by 
the binary variable taking the value one. We use these variables as proxies to measure the 
women’s welfare and empowerment in the marital family. Figure 2 presents the extent to which 
women have the decision-making power within the household on each of five matters. Among 
all female respondents who answered the questions, 82.5% and 29.7% have decision-making 
power about what to cook on a daily basis and when their children fall sick, respectively, while 
few women have decision-making power about the matters that are strategically important in the 
long term, such as the purchase of expensive items (9.5%), the number of children (18.3%), and 
the marriage of their children (8.5%).  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of socioeconomic variables. The average age of the 
women is 34.5 years and their average age at marriage is 17.5 years. Almost half of the women 
are illiterate. Their average schooling is 4.2 years, while their husbands’ average is 6.3 years. 
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Our sample has 39% of respondents living in urban areas. Household income is the sum of all 
sources, namely, family farm income, wages and salaries, net business income, income from 
property, remittances, and transfers from the government. The average annual household 
income is Rs.49,804.5 Although the typical test of the Nash bargaining model considers wages 
as an outside option, we do not consider them here, given that they are less likely to affect the 
outside options in the context of South Asia.6 Wages are reported by only 27.2% of married 
women and 71.5% of their husbands, which characterizes Indian society where women usually 
do not work outside their home and a considerable number of men are self-employed. Thus, 
wages only partially capture information about the earning capacity or wealth of the individual. 
The variables related to gender relations within the household and those specific to Indian 
society, such as caste and religion variables, are also reported in Table 1. We consider two 
variables reflecting gender relations: one is the relative wealth of the natal household, which 
takes the value one when the woman’s natal family is better off than her husband’s family at the 
time of marriage, and the other is endogamy, which takes the value one when any member of 
the woman’s family is married into her husband’s family, the woman is related to her husband 
by blood, or the woman has grown up in the same village/town as her husband. The endogeneity 
of endogamy is treated using the methodology described in the next section.  
The average amount of dowries is Rs.101,039, which is almost twice as large as the 
average annual household income, while the average bride price is Rs.65,683. This seems 
consistent with the common view that dowries are several times greater than annual household 
incomes. The IHDS asks the amount of money usually spent by the bride’s (or groom’s) family 
at the time of marriage. Since the questionnaire allows for some range in the amounts responded, 
we take the median value spent by the bride’s (or groom’s) family for our definition of dowry 
                                                        
5 In the regression analysis, non-wage income (i.e., total income minus wages and salaries) is used 
as a control variable for the endogeneity concern. The use of total income is alternatively checked 
and does not affect the estimation results.  
6 Inclusion of wage information does not affect the main results. The results are available upon 
request.  
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(or bride price). It should be noted that the dowry (or bride price) in the IHDS is not the amount 
paid at the time of the respondent’s marriage, but the customary amount paid in the community 
of the respondent. The reason the question does not ask for the personal amount of dowry may 
be due to the fact that dowry is a banned practice in India. Another reason may be to formulate 
the exogenous variables of dowry that do not capture the individual household characteristics. 
Rahman and Rao (2004) insist on the importance of using the community-based variables on the 
right hand side (RHS) to deal with endogeneity in their study of women’s decision-making 
power in the household.7 However, it is still possible that the community-based dowry variable 
captures the respondent’s unobserved characteristics. The potential endogeneity of the 
community-based dowry variable is further addressed in the next section. 
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
The identification relies on a difference-in-differences strategy that compares the effects of 
dowry on the women’s status in the marital household when women married before and after 
the amendment across the reform and nonreform states.8 The control group comprises women 
who are not affected by the amendment. This includes those women who reside in the reform 
states and married before the amendment as well as those who reside in the nonreform states 
and those other than Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs. The treatment group consists of 
                                                        
7 They study how kinship affects the women’s decision-making power. Their measure of kinship is 
community-based, such as the village exogamy, and not based on whether the husband and wife are 
blood relatives.  
8 Precisely speaking, the amendment is applied to those who marry and whose paternal grandfather 
died after the amendment. Moreover, the states where women currently reside are not necessarily the 
same as their natal or marital states, while the latter determines the reform and nonreform states. 
Since the IHDS does not include information on the timing of the woman’s paternal grandfather’s 
death or her natal/marital states, the timing of a woman’s marriage in her current resident state is 
used in the difference-in-differences strategy. The unavailability of information on the women’s 
natal states may not be serious in this study, given that inter-state marriages before the amendment 
were not very common in the southern states where the amendment was preceded. We believe that 
the timing of marriage in the current resident state vis-à-vis the amendment is more important for the 
purpose of this study because a woman’s status can be affected not only by whether she actually 
inherits ancestral property but also by changes in attitude following the amendment (see Roy 2015). 
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women who married after, and are thus affected by, the amendment in the reform states, namely, 
Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994.9  
Although the variable of dowries (bride prices) in the IHDS is the customary amount paid 
in the community of the respondent, it may possibly capture some individual household 
characteristics. For example, when the female respondent has more decision-making power 
about her daughter’s marriage and treats her daughter and son equally, she may report a smaller 
amount of dowry that is prevalent in her community than the respondents who have a strong 
“son preference.” The endogeneity problem is a real challenge because finding good candidates 
for instruments of dowry is usually very difficult. This study addresses the endogeneity problem 
in two ways. First, we check how important the remaining unobservables should be in 
explaining the current results by following the procedure developed by Altonji et al. (2005) 
although a set of covariates cannot control for the possible correlation between unobserved 
household characteristics and women’s decision-making power in the household.10 Second, 
while there is no good candidate for the instrumental variable (IV) in the dataset, we take the IV 
approach by constructing an instrument of dowry utilizing the “- 𝑖 method,” following Aizer 
(2010) and Vogl (2013). The IV is constructed as follows: 
 
𝐷𝚤𝚤���� = 1𝑛−1∑ 𝐷𝑘−𝑖𝑘               (1)  
 
where 𝐷𝚤𝚤���� is the average amount of dowry (or bride price) reported by women in the same 
village, 𝑗, except for respondent 𝑖. By construction, 𝐷𝚤𝚤���� is not correlated with the respondent’s 
                                                        
9 Kerala amended the Hindu Succession Act in 1976, but it is excluded here based on the literature 
that points out the abnormality of Kerala, especially with respect to the status of women and the 
necessity of excluding this state when studying gender-related issues (e.g., Deininger et al. 2013; 
Anderson and Genicot 2015). At any rate, the inclusion of Kerala does not substantially alter the 
main estimation results. The results including Kerala are available upon request. 
10 For examples of studies using the same procedure, see Kingdon and Teal (2010) and Bellows and 
Miguel (2009).  
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individual household’s unobserved characteristics, while it may correlate with the amount of 
dowry personally paid at the time of the respondent’s marriage by, say, capturing the 
marriage-market situation in the village and the village-level wealth. A higher dowry implies 
that the bride’s threat point is also higher, in the sense that she has more of an incentive to go 
back to her parents or that any repeated transfers from the bride’s parents are more meaningful. 
The instrument for bride prices is constructed in the same manner. As expected, the correlations 
between the individual dowry and the average village dowry, as well as between the individual 
bride price and the average village bride price, are positive and high, at 0.55 and 0.49, 
respectively. 𝐷𝚤𝚤���� , in fact, has a significantly positive effect on 𝐷𝑖𝑖  (see the first-stage 
regression in Table 2). 
We test the Nash bargaining model with the amount of dowry that represents the women’s 
outside option, as in Zhang and Chan (1999) and Brown (2009). The refutable implication is 
that the amount of dowry increases the women’s bargaining position and their welfare in the 
marital family. In order to estimate the relationship between a dowry and the variables showing 
the women’s decision-making power, we use the following linear probability model (LPM):11 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑖 × 𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝟔′𝒙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖      (2) 
 
Our interest lies in 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 (or 𝛽4 and 𝛽5), the difference between the treatment and 
control groups in the impact of dowry (or bride price) on the probability of women in household 
𝑖 in state 𝑠 having a high bargaining position in the marital household, namely, the women’s 
decision-making power. 𝐴𝑖𝑖 takes the value one when a woman married after the amendment 
in the reform states. The vector 𝒙𝑖𝑖  is a set of covariates: household socioeconomic 
                                                        
11 The implication given by the probit model instead of the LPM is not substantially different. The 
probit estimation results are available upon request. 
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characteristics shown in the summary statistics, and  𝜂𝑖  is the state fixed effects. 12 The 
unearned household incomes are controlled in our estimations. We have also checked the set of 
covariates that include the total household income from all sources and/or the husbands’ 
wages.13 The results are not substantially different with respect to which income variables are 
included. Two variables that reflect gender relations within the household are included: one is 
the relative wealth of the natal household and the other is endogamy. We construct a 
community-based variable for endogamy using the “- 𝑖 method” because such a marriage 
practice is possibly endogenous (Rahman and Rao 2004). The variables specific to Indian 
society such as the caste and religion variables are also included. These variables are considered 
exogenous because one’s caste or religion is not chosen by the individual. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1.  Main Results 
The LPM given in equation (2) is estimated and the results are reported in Table 3. Dowry has 
significantly positive effects on the decision making of women who are not affected by the 
amendment. The positive effects are consistently observed across different decision-making 
matters: how to treat sick children, the purchase of expensive items, how many children they 
have, and the marriage of their children. The fact that there is no significant effect on decision 
making about what to cook is understandable, given that the majority of women has this power 
by default. These positive effects are significantly reversed for women affected by the 
amendment with respect to decision making on the purchase of expensive items and fertility. On 
the other hand, a bride price has a significantly negative effect on women’s decision making on 
                                                        
12 We cannot include the village fixed effects because the IV based on the “- 𝑖 method” captures the 
village-level marriage-market situation. Also, the endogamy variable is treated by the “- 𝑖 method,” 
and thus multicollinearity occurs with the village fixed effects.  
13 We do not include the women’s wages as an explanatory variable, since it is difficult to impute 
the missing values due to various possible reasons for non-reporting. Wages are reported by only 
27.2% of married women. For the remaining 72.8%, it is not clear whether the women work at home 
or in family enterprises without pay. The inclusion of wages is not critical in testing our model. 
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how to treat sick children and no consistent effect on the decision making of women who are 
affected by the amendment. In sum, dowry is positively associated with women’s status in the 
states where women do not have equal inheritance rights as their brothers and it is negatively 
associated with women’s status in the states where women have equal inheritance rights as their 
brothers. 
Following the method by Altonji et al. (2005), we examine how important the remaining 
unobservables should be to completely remove the effects observed in Table 3. The estimation 
procedure is repeated without a set of covariates and the coefficient estimates are reported in 
Table 4. Comparing the coefficient estimates of dowry in Table 3 and Table 4 suggests that the 
inclusion of a set of covariates reduces the effects of dowry on women’s decision-making power 
respecting the treatment of sick children, the purchase of expensive items, and fertility by 0.1, 0, 
and 0.06 percentage points, respectively. The estimated effects of the unobservables have to be 
2 times, 18 times, and 2 times larger than the effects of the observables to completely remove 
the above respective effects of dowry on women’s decision-making power. Given a rich set of 
observables such as a household’s socioeconomic variables, caste, religion, and state fixed 
effects in Table 3, it is unlikely that the effects of the unobservables are large enough to 
completely remove the effects of dowry. Furthermore, the effect on the women’s decision 
making concerning the marriage of their children becomes significant and larger in magnitude 
by the inclusion of a set of covariates, which implies that the removal of the effects by the 
unobservables is highly unlikely.  
Next, we estimate equation (2) using the IVs given by equation (1). The IV coefficient 
estimates of interest are reported in Table 5. Overall, the results support the implication given 
by the LPM estimates. The base effects of dowry are much larger than those estimated by the 
LPM, which implies that the status of women without equal inheritance rights as their brothers 
is enhanced by a higher dowry. These positive effects are not negligible in magnitude. One 
standard deviation above the dowry mean enhances the women’s decision-making power 
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regarding how to treat sick children, the purchase of expensive items, the number of children, 
and the marriage of their children by 31, 7, 11, and 6 percentage points, respectively. The effect 
on the status of women who could be affected by the amendment becomes ambiguous with 
larger standard errors, except for the women’s decision making on fertility. The 
decision-making power on fertility of women who have the same inheritance rights as their 
brothers is reduced by a higher dowry. Likewise, the effects of a bride price are greater than 
those estimated by the LPM. The effects of a bride price are mostly opposite to the effects of 
dowry, except for the decision making on the marriage of children. The overall results support 
the hypothesis derived from the Nash bargaining model that implies that the assets brought into 
marriage; for example, a dowry by the bride, enhances her bargaining position in the marital 
household, while a bride price brought by the groom reduces her bargaining position in a society 
where women’s property rights are not protected. Women’s bargaining position is not enhanced 
or it becomes worse by a higher dowry when women have equal inheritance rights as men.  
 
5.2. Robustness Checks 
The Nash bargaining model implies that the assets brought into marriage by both sides 
determine the bargaining position of the wife and husband, and thus, the effect of the net dowry 
(dowry minus bride price) matters in determining the women’s status in the marital household. 
The estimation procedure is repeated with and without IVs, and the coefficient estimates of net 
dowry are reported in Table 6. Overall, the results support the implication of the Nash 
bargaining model that the assets brought into the marriage (i.e., the net amount of dowry by the 
bride) enhance her decision-making power regarding how to treat sick children, the purchase of 
expensive items, how many children she has, and the marriage of her children. These positive 
effects are observed for the women without equal inheritance rights as their brothers. These 
effects are not surprising, given that the effects of a bride price are mostly opposite to those of a 
dowry in the previous estimations. Being consistent with the previous results, these positive 
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effects seem to disappear when women have equal inheritance rights as their brothers, especially 
on their decision making respecting the purchase of expensive items and fertility.  
Because the states that experienced the amendment are all located in southern India, the 
opposite effects of dowry between the reform and nonreform states may not be due to the 
amendment itself, but to the pro-gender nature of southern India. With this concern, the main 
estimation procedure is repeated by replacing the amendment with an indicator taking the value 
one when a woman resides in a southern state. The coefficient estimates of interest are reported 
in Table 7.14 The base effects of dowry are very similar to those shown in Table 3, but the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction term are very different. This means that the non-positive 
effects of dowry on the status of women who are affected by the amendment are not derived by 
the fact that they reside in southern states.  
The women who are affected by the amendment and marry after the year when the 
amendment passed in the state where they live are thus naturally younger. Because the modern 
dowry is often criticized as a symbol of gender discrimination, while the traditional dowry is not 
(Billig 1992; Srinivas 1994), it is possible that the non-positive effects of dowry are only 
observed in the younger cohort. Therefore, the opposite effects of dowry between the reform 
and nonreform states may simply capture the marriage-year cohort effect. To examine this 
possibility, the estimation procedure is repeated by including four marriage-year cohort 
dummies (the reference cohort is women who married before 1976) and their interactions with 
dowry and bride price, respectively. The results are reported in Table 8.15 The base effects of 
dowry are not significant, except for the decision making on how to treat sick children, but the 
magnitudes are similar to those presented in Table 3. No interaction term is significant, which 
means that the non-positive effects of dowry on the status of women who are affected by the 
                                                        
14 The estimation with IVs is also repeated by replacing the amendment with the southern indicator. 
The results support the estimation results given in Table 7 and are available upon request.  
15 The estimation with IVs is similarly conducted. The results support the estimation results given in 
Table 8 and are available upon request.  
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amendment are not derived by the marriage-year cohort effects.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Exploiting the natural experiment given by the state-level amendment of the Hindu Succession 
Act, our estimations provide evidence that dowry enhances women’s status in the marital 
household when women have no inheritance rights. When they are given equal inheritance 
rights as their brothers, the effects of dowry are non-positive and sometimes negative. The 
results are consistent with Jejeebhoy’s (2000) hypothesis that dowries empower women in the 
northern states where women’s status is relatively low, while they do not function as such in the 
pro-gender southern states. This study has further examined a mechanism proposed by 
Jejeebhoy in terms of generating such north–south differences and suggests that property or 
inheritance rights are the key.  
The results have some policy implications. The total ineffectiveness of the legal ban on 
dowry is well known. If the policy’s objective is to effectively let people abandon the practice 
of dowry, a more effective way may be to assure property and inheritance rights for women. On 
the other hand, an outright ban on dowry does not necessarily lead to the better treatment of 
women. In the context of India, where women do not have equal inheritance rights as their 
brothers in reality, dowries may function as the only way to enhance women’s status in the 
marital household. In this case, dowry may be an example of a social institution that 
complements an imperfect legal system. Examples of such social institutions include watta-satta 
(exchange marriage, see Jacoby and Mansuri 2010), purdah (women’s segregation), and 
caste/cousin endogamy. How these seemingly costly practices alleviate formal institutional 
failures is left for future research.  
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Figure 1: Years of amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in each state 
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Figure 2: Women’s decision-making power within the household (woman has the most 
decision-making power = 1) 
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percentage of women who have most say
marriage of children (N=23,172)
number of children (N= 23,513)
purchase of expensive items (N= 23,787)
what to cook (N= 23,724)
when a child falls sick (N= 23,363)
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 Table 1 
 Summary statistics 
  Mean 
Woman’s age 34.51  
 
(7.56) 
Woman’s age at marriage 17.45  
 
(3.63) 
Age difference (husband-wife) 5.60  
 
(3.68) 
HH income (Rs.) 49804  
 
(64143) 
Agricultural land owned (acre) 10.94  
 
(184.18) 
Dowry (Rs.) 101039  
 
(108182) 
Bride Price (Rs.) 65683  
 
(78536) 
Women’s literacy (yes =1) 0.526  
 
(0.499) 
Women’s school years 4.18  
 
(4.68) 
Husband‘s school years 6.32  
 
(4.89) 
Urban (yes =1) 0.385  
 
(0.487) 
Brahmin (yes =1) 0.053  
 
(0.223) 
Highcaste (yes =1) 0.166  
 
(0.372) 
Scheduled caste (yes =1) 0.211  
 
(0.408) 
Scheduled tribe (yes =1) 0.083  
 
(0.275) 
Other backward caste (yes =1) 0.394  
 
(0.489) 
Hindu (yes =1) 0.807  
 
(0.395) 
Muslim (yes =1) 0.121  
 
(0.326) 
Christian (yes =1) 0.030  
 
(0.170) 
Sikh (yes =1) 0.021  
 
(0.143) 
Buddhist (yes =1) 0.007  
 
(0.083) 
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(Table 1 continued)  
Other religions except for Hindu (yes 
=1) 0.015  
 
(0.121) 
Wealth (natal>husband’s family, =1) 0.191  
 
(0.393) 
Endogamous marriage (yes =1) 0.274  
 
(0.446) 
Number of observations 24098 
Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 2 
 First stage regression (only coefficient estimates of the excluded variables are reported)   
  
Dowry 
(Rs.10,000) 
Dowry×
amendment 
Bride Price 
(Rs.10,000) 
Bride price×
amendment 
Net dowry 
(Rs.10,000) 
Net dowry×
amendment 
Village(-i) dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.467*** -0.0110*** 0.117*** -0.0040*** 
  
 
(0.0381) (0.0016) (0.0223) (0.0012) 
  Village(-i) dowry×amendment 0.0451 0.709*** -0.0025 0.198** 
  
 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.0961) (0.0967) 
  Village(-i) bride price (Rs.10,000) 0.182*** -0.0041** 0.427*** -0.0064*** 
  
 
(0.0528) (0.0021) (0.0411) (0.0017) 
  Village(-i) bride price×amendment -0.0750 0.191* -0.0951 0.444*** 
  
 
(0.109) (0.109) (0.138) (0.138) 
  Village(-i) net dowry (Rs.10,000) 
    
0.366*** -0.0095*** 
     
(0.0304) (0.0017) 
Village(-i) net dowry×amendment 
    
0.0542 0.565*** 
     
(0.0871) (0.0858) 
       Observations 22,922 22,922 22,922 22,922 22,922 22,922 
R-squared 0.362 0.612 0.305 0.524 0.106 0.256 
F statistics  115.42 64.74 87.24 40.62 81.85 50.84 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The included variables are the same as those in 
Table 3.  
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Table 3 
Effects of dowry/bride price on women’s decision-making power in the reform and nonreform states 
with control variables (woman has the most decision-making power = 1): estimated by LPM 
  
if a child 
falls sick 
what to 
cook 
purchase of 
expensive 
items 
number of 
children 
marriage of 
children 
Dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0019*** 0.0002 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0007** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Dowry×amendment -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0017** -0.0027** -0.0002 
 
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
Bride price (Rs.10,000) -0.0014** -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Bride price×amendment 0.0028 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0037** -0.0021* 
 
(0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0011) 
Amendment 0.0086 0.0147 0.0126 0.0056 0.0170* 
 
(0.0167) (0.0131) (0.0108) (0.0141) (0.0102) 
Caste variables (dummies, the excluded is middle caste): 
Brahmin  0.0118 -0.0114 -0.0039 0.0092 -0.0019 
 
(0.0205) (0.0181) (0.0130) (0.0176) (0.0122) 
Highcaste  0.0259 -0.0081 -0.0061 0.0196 0.0045 
 
(0.0175) (0.0154) (0.0108) (0.0144) (0.0105) 
Scheduled caste  0.0189 -0.0377** 0.0099 0.0104 0.0018 
 
(0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0107) (0.0140) (0.0102) 
Scheduled tribe  0.0044 -0.0340** -0.0131 -0.0035 0.0100 
 
(0.0184) (0.0168) (0.0118) (0.0154) (0.0117) 
Other backward caste  0.0107 -0.0341** 0.0025 0.0084 0.0019 
 
(0.0154) (0.0140) (0.0098) (0.0128) (0.0094) 
Socio-economic variables: 
     Woman’s age 0.0137*** 0.0092*** 0.0042** 0.0046* 0.0017 
 
(0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0020) 
Woman’s age^2 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Woman’s age at marriage 0.0007 -0.0015* 0.0009 -0.0011 0.0001 
 
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Age difference 
(husband-wife) 
0.0015* 0.0000 0.0015** 0.0018** 0.0005 
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Women’s school years 0.0054** 0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0003 
 
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
Women’s school years^2 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Husband’s school years -0.0044** -0.0034** -0.0034*** -0.0006 -0.0024** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0012) 
Husband’s school years^2 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
HH non-wage income 
(Rs.10,000) 
-0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0006* -0.0007 -0.0007** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Agricultural land owned 
(10 acre) 
-0.0002** -0.0002 0.0000  0.0001 -0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
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(Table 3 continued)      
Urban (yes =1) 0.0249*** 0.0350*** 0.0209*** 0.0241*** 0.0087** 
 
(0.0071) (0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0044) 
Religion variables (dummies, the excluded is Hindu): 
Muslim  0.0057 -0.0097 -0.0143* -0.0184 -0.0135* 
 
(0.0131) (0.0123) (0.0084) (0.0114) (0.0075) 
Christian  0.0173 0.0319* 0.0111 0.0094 0.0188 
 
(0.0242) (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0205) (0.0158) 
Sikh 0.0186 0.0306 0.0251 0.0201 0.0204 
 
(0.0291) (0.0253) (0.0153) (0.0220) (0.0149) 
Buddhist  -0.0066 0.0098 -0.0038 -0.0208 0.0108 
 
(0.0384) (0.0262) (0.0208) (0.0224) (0.0217) 
Other non-Hindu religions 0.0131 0.0328* -0.0132 -0.004 -0.0128 
 
(0.0256) (0.0188) (0.0177) (0.0222) (0.0169) 
Gender relations variables (dummies): 
Wealth (natal>husband’s 
family, =1) 
-0.0126* -0.0426*** 0.0257*** -0.0166*** 0.0089* 
(0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0053) (0.0064) (0.0048) 
Village: Endogamous 
marriage 
0.125*** -0.0660*** 0.0343*** 0.0611*** 0.0539*** 
(0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0089) 
Constant -0.103 0.574*** -0.0766* 0.0444 0.0967 
 
(0.0962) (0.0943) (0.0456) (0.0770) (0.0823) 
      Observations 22,240 22,578 22,632 22,377 22,073 
R-squared 0.122 0.058 0.115 0.133 0.142 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). State dummies are included in the RHS. 
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Table 4 
Effects of dowry/bride price on women’s decision-making power in the reform and nonreform states 
without control variables: estimated by LPM 
  
if a child 
falls sick 
what to 
cook 
purchase of 
expensive 
items 
number of 
children 
marriage of 
children 
Dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0030*** 0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0018*** 0.0004 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Dowry×amendment -0.0017 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0009 
 
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
Bride price (Rs.10,000) -0.0007 -0.0012** -0.0007* -0.0005 -0.0009** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Bride price×
amendment 
0.0031 0.0019 0.0004 0.0049** -0.0012 
(0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0011) 
Amendment 0.0632*** 0.0423*** 0.0149 -0.0271** -0.0040 
 
(0.0145) (0.0110) (0.0091) (0.0118) (0.0086) 
Constant 0.263*** 0.825*** 0.0907*** 0.170*** 0.0873*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0032) 
      Observations 22,430 22,776 22,831 22,566 22,264 
R-squared 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). 
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Table 5 
Effects of dowry/bride price on women’s decision-making power in the reform and nonreform 
states with control variables: IV estimation (only coefficient estimates of interest are reported) 
  
if a child 
falls sick 
what to 
cook 
purchase of 
expensive 
items 
number of 
children 
marriage of 
children 
Dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0287*** -0.0018 0.0066*** 0.0105*** 0.0060*** 
 
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0020) 
Dowry×amendment 0.0315 0.0052 -0.0011 -0.0156** 0.0086 
 
(0.0192) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0066) 
Bride price (Rs.10,000) -0.0362*** 0.0012 -0.0080*** -0.0099** -0.0072*** 
 
(0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0028) 
Bride price×amendment -0.0572 0.0011 -0.0070 0.0247** -0.0221* 
 
(0.0377) (0.0092) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0120) 
Amendment 0.0457 -0.0379* 0.0421** 0.0127 0.0457** 
 
(0.0630) (0.0210) (0.0198) (0.0213) (0.0232) 
      Observations 22,240 22,578 22,632 22,377 22,073 
Robust regression test of 
exogeneity (p-value) 
25.95 
(0.0000) 
3.43 
(0.0082) 
2.68 
(0.0299) 
5.31 
(0.0003) 
5.49 
(0.0002) 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%). The included variables are the same as those in Table 3.  
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Table 6 
Effects of net dowry on women’s decision-making power in the reform and nonreform states with 
control variables (only coefficient estimates of interest are reported) 
  
if a child 
falls sick 
what to 
cook 
purchase of 
expensive 
items 
number of 
children 
marriage of 
children 
A. LPM estimation 
     Net dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0018*** 0.0002 0.0007** 0.0011*** 0.0006** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Net dowry×
amendment 
-0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0028** 0.0001 
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
Amendment 0.0205 0.0141 -0.0008 0.0108 0.0044 
 
(0.0140) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0105) (0.0083) 
B. IV estimation 
     Net dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0251*** -0.0023 0.0061*** 0.0108*** 0.0055*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0017) 
Net dowry×
amendment 
0.0179** 0.0090** -0.0058* -0.0105*** 0.0006 
(0.0081) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0036) 
Amendment -0.0391 -0.0195 0.0167 0.0417** 0.0042 
 
(0.0314) (0.0173) (0.0138) (0.0171) (0.0149) 
      Observations 22,240 22,578 22,632 22,377 22,073 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). The included variables are the same as those in Table 3.  
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Table 7 
Effects of dowry/bride price on women’s decision-making power in the southern states and other 
states: estimated by LPM (only coefficient estimates of interest are reported) 
  
if a child falls 
sick 
what to 
cook 
purchase of 
expensive 
items 
number of 
children 
marriage of 
children 
Dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0014*** -0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0011*** 0.0006** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Dowry×south 0.0025** 0.0015** -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0004 
 
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Bride price 
(Rs.10,000) -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0000 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Bride price×south -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0022** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
Southern states 0.0182 -0.0036 0.0321** 0.0172 0.0168 
 
(0.0221) (0.0187) (0.0157) (0.0186) (0.0146) 
      Observations 22,240 22,578 22,632 22,377 22,073 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). The included variables are the same as those in Table 3.  
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Table 8 
Effects of dowry/bride price on women’s decision-making power by marriage cohort: estimated by 
LPM (only coefficient estimates of interest are reported) 
Variables 
if a child 
falls sick 
what to 
cook 
purchase of 
expensive 
items 
number of 
children 
marriage of 
children 
Dowry (Rs.10,000) 0.0025** -0.0001 0.0007 0.0016 0.0012 
 
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Dowry×cohort2 0.0003 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 
 
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Dowry×cohort3 -0.0020 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0016 
 
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
Dowry×cohort4 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0009 0.0002 
 
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0012) 
Dowry×cohort5 -0.0022 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0008 
 
(0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Bride price (Rs.10,000) -0.0029** 0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0020** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0010) 
Bride price×cohort2 0.0012 -0.0026 0.0012 0.0011 0.0021* 
 
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0011) 
Bride price×cohort3 0.0037* -0.0014 0.0014 0.0031* 0.0040*** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Bride price×cohort4 -0.0004 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0018 0.0001 
 
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0012) 
Bride price×cohort5 0.0027 -0.0025 0.0006 0.0023 0.0015 
 
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) 
Cohort2 0.0249 -0.0090 -0.0075 -0.0232 -0.0168 
 
(0.0198) (0.0182) (0.0129) (0.0175) (0.0125) 
Cohort3 0.0313 0.0036 -0.0062 -0.0432* -0.0181 
 
(0.0261) (0.0233) (0.0170) (0.0225) (0.0165) 
Cohort4 0.0488* 0.0285 -0.0016 -0.0066 -0.0171 
 
(0.0286) (0.0250) (0.0183) (0.0247) (0.0177) 
Cohort5 0.0480 0.0438 -0.0057 -0.0092 -0.0346 
 
(0.0344) (0.0301) (0.0220) (0.0293) (0.0213) 
      Observations 22,240 22,578 22,632 22,377 22,073 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). The included variables are the same as those in Table 3. The marriage-year cohorts are 
separated by the year when the Hindu Succession Act was amended in each state. The shares of 
women who are in cohort 1 (married before 1976), cohort 2 (married 1976–1985), cohort 3 (married 
1986–1988), cohort 4 (married 1989–1993), and cohort 5 (married after1993) are 6.9 %, 33.5%, 
12.2%, 19.8%, and 27.6%, respectively.  
 
